

















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2784 











An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









It has been argued that increased life expectancy raises the rate of return on education, 
causing a rise in the investment in education followed by an increase in lifetime labor supply. 
Empirical evidence of these relations is rather weak. Building on a lifecycle model with 
uncertain longevity, this paper shows that increased life expectancy does not suffice to 
warrant the above hypotheses. We provide assumptions about the change in survival 
probabilities, specifically about the age dependence of hazard rates, which determine 
individuals’ behavioral response w.r.t. education, work and age of retirement. Comparison is 
made between the case when individuals have access to a competitive annuity market and the 
case of no insurance. 
JEL Code: D11, D91, E21, G23. 
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August 2009 1 Introduction1
The causal e⁄ect of increased life expectancy on the rise of investment in human
capital has been extensively studied. The evidence is mixed: Acemoglu and John-
son (2006) and Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2008), using cross-country
regressions, ￿nd no systematic relation. Bilos and Klenow (2000) and Manuelli
and Seshodri (2005) ￿nd a positive relation, although of di⁄erent magnitudes.
The theoretical reason why such a relation is expected was ￿rst formulated by
Ben-Porath (1967), followed by a number of studies in the development literature
(e.g. Cervellati and Sunde (2005) and Hall and Jones (1999)). The argument is
that "falling mortality... raises the rate of return on investments in a child￿ s human
capital and thus can induce households to make quality-quantity trade-o⁄" (Galor
and Weil (1999)). Hazan (2009) observes that the higher returns to education have
to be realized via a longer working life. He therefore hypothesizes that higher life
expectancy leads to larger investment in education accompanied by an increase in
lifetime labor supply. However, his time-series study of American and European
men (1840-1970) ￿nds no relation between life expectancy and lifetime labor.
The motivation for this paper is to provide an explanation for this gap be-
tween these hypotheses, which form the conventional wisdom on the subject, and
the empirical evidence. On the basis of an individual lifetime model with uncertain
longevity, it is demonstrated that the above relations cannot be based solely on
rises in life expectancy. Rather, they require speci￿c conditions on the changes
in survival probabilities. The salient feature of this paper is a representation of
uncertain longevity by an age-dependent survival function. When survival prob-
abilities rise at all ages, behavioral response depends crucially on the change in
the Hazard-Rate. An increase in life expectancy may lead to di⁄erent decisions
about investment in education and retirement age, depending on the change in the
Hazard-Rate at di⁄erent ages. We demonstrate that this is the missing feature in
previous studies of individuals￿response to higher longevity.
Section 2 introduces survival functions, their associated life expectancy and
the hazard-rate. It characterizes the relation between a shift of a survival function
and the change in the hazard-rate.
1I want to thank my colleague Moshe Hazan for suggesting the question analyzed here, a
natural extension of Sheshinski (2008).
2In Section 3 we build a standard lifetime model with uncertain longevity,
where the individual chooses the lifetime consumption path, the length of time
devoted to education, followed by a period of work and then the age of retirement.
Perfectly competitive insurance markets are assumed to be available. Three propo-
sitions provide su¢ cient conditions to enable in some cases a determination of the
e⁄ects of a rise in longevity on consumption, the level of education and retirement.
Section 4 conducts the same analysis under the assumption that no annuity
markets are available. While a limited number of private annuity products are
available in advanced economies, their market is characterized by adverse selection
and moral hazard. It is worth, therefore, to study individuals￿response in the
absence of this market. The results in this case are similar, and even ￿ sharper￿ ,
than in previous sections.
The general conclusion that emerges from this paper is that while a rise in life
expectancy is inadequate to explain the increased investment in education, certain
(testable) conditions formulated in the paper may con￿rm conventional wisdom.
2 Survival Functions and Longevity Changes
Age is a continuous variable, z, whose range is from 0 to maximum lifetime, T.
Formally, it is possible to allow T = 1: Age 0 should be interpreted as the age at
which individuals make decisions about consumption, an initial period of education
followed by a working period and then retirement. Uncertainty about longevity,
that is the age of death, is represented by a survival distribution function, F(z;￿);
which is the probability of survival to age z. The exogenous parameter ￿ represents
factors which a⁄ect longevity, such as health and family circumstances. The focus
is on how individuals respond to changes in these factors.
The function F(z;￿) satis￿es F(0;￿) = 1; F(T;￿) = 0 and F(z;￿) strictly
decreases in z, for any ￿2: We shall assume that F(z;￿) is di⁄erentiable in z and
￿ and hence the probability of death at age z, f(z;￿); which is the density of
function of 1 ￿ F(z;￿); exists for all z, f(z;￿) = ￿
@F(z;￿)
@z
> 0; 0 < z < T:
2Thus, when T is ￿nite it generally depends on ￿.










A commonly used survival function is
F(z;￿;T) =
e￿￿z ￿ e￿￿T
1 ￿ e￿￿T 0 ￿ z ￿ T (2)
is a function of two parameters, ￿ > 0 and T > 0. When T = 1 this becomes the




As in (2), we take an increase in ￿ to decrease survival probabilities at all ages:
@F(z;￿)
@￿




It will be seen that individuals￿response to a change in ￿ depends on the
magnitude of the changes in survival probabilities in di⁄erent ages. Notice, for
example, that in (2), changes in ￿ and in T have very di⁄erent e⁄ects on F(z;￿)
(Figure 1).
Figure 1
4A change in ￿ a⁄ects mainly medium ages while a change in T a⁄ects largely
older ages.
Each survival function has an associated Hazard-Rate, the conditional proba-


















The function ￿(z;￿) (< 0) is the relative decrease of survival probability at
age z due to a small increase in ￿: The shape of this function plays an important
role in our analysis. In particular, individual behavior will be shown to depend on
whether ￿(z;￿) increases or decreases with z.
Figure 2 displays the case when ￿(z;￿) decreases in z, which means that the
relative increase in survival probabilities due to a decrease in ￿ rises with age.
Figure 2
Notably, the historical pattern of ￿(z;￿) has been uneven: Cuttler, Deaton and
Lleras-Muney (2006) and others distinguish three phases in modern history: in the
early 20th century, infants￿survival probabilities improved dramatically, followed
in mid century by major improvements of survival probabilities in middle-ages (50-
70) due to the cardio-vascular revolution. During recent decades, improvements
of life prospects due to new medical technologies focused mainly on the old and
5the very old3. These historical phases suggest that models in which longevity is
represented only by life expectancy are missing the important relation between the
rise in survival probabilities at di⁄erent ages.
3 Lifecycle Model with Longevity Risk
Denote consumption at age z by c(z). Utility of consumption, u(c), is assumed
to be positive, independent of age, strictly increasing and concave: u0(c) > 0;
u00(c) < 0: Assume further that when working the individual provides 1 unit of
labor. Disutility of work, a(z); is independent of consumption and increasing with
age, a0(z) > 0: Individuals spend ages 0 to e in education. The focus is on the pro-
ductivity enhancing value of education disregarding its possible direct consumption
value.
With no subjective discount rate (time preference) and no bequest motive,








When working, an individual with a level of education e receives a wage of




= w1(z;e) > 0;
@2w(z;e)
@e2 = w11(z;e) < 0:
With a zero rate of return on non-annuitized assets and perfectly competitive
insurance markets that allow annuitization of savings (including contingent loans4),






w(z;e)F(z;e)dz = 0 (5)
3The incorporation of direct utility from education would essentially not a⁄ect the results
below.
4In Section 4 we discuss the case when such annuitization is not available.
5We disregard tuition fees for e. Adding such fees would not a⁄ect the results below.
6Maximization of (4) s.t. (5) w.r.t. c(z) yields an optimum constant consump-
tion ￿ ow, c(z) = c, 0 ￿ z ￿ T: The level of c depends, via the budget constraint,







Consumption equals expected wages divided by life expectancy.
The ￿rst order condition for an optimum retirement age, R, is
u
0(c)w(R;e) ￿ a(R) = 0 (7)
At the optimum, the marginal bene￿t of a small postponement in retirement
is equal to marginal labor disutility.












: At the optimum, the marginal bene￿t of an additional
investment in education, equal to the marginal utility of the conditional expected
increase in lifetime wages, is equated to the marginal cost, which is the marginal
utility times the wage at e less the disutility of work.
Conditions (6)-(8) jointly determine optimum consumption, retirement age
and the level of education, denoted (c￿;R￿;e￿):
To facilitate the subsequent analysis, we shall make two simplifying (inessen-
tial) assumptions. First, let wages be independent of age, w(z;e) = w(e) (w0(e) >
0; w00(e) < 0). Second, assume that there is no labor disutility at the beginning of









0(c)w(e) ￿ a(R) = 0 (10)
6It seems reasonable that labor disutility at age e does not play a signi￿cant role, compared






F(z;￿)dz ￿ w(e) = 0 (11)
where in (10), c is substituted from (9). Given ￿; the functions ’ and   are curves
in the (R;e) plane. In the Appendix it is shown that they are both upward sloping
and, by the second-order conditions, ’ is steeper than   at the unique intersection
point (R￿;e￿) (Figure 3).
Figure 3
Generally, R￿ and e￿ depend on ￿: The following proposition provides a suf-
￿cient condition which enables determination of the direction of this dependence:








The result in Proposition 1 is depicted in Figure 4. As shown in the Appendix,
a decrease in ￿ shifts the curve ’ = 0 downward and to the right. The curve   = 0
8shifts upward and to the left. The new solution, (R￿￿;e￿￿); has R￿￿ > R￿ and
e￿￿ > e￿:
Figure 4: ￿1 < ￿0
Proposition 1 seems to con￿rm the conventional wisdom (see Hazan (2009))
that, abstracting from other e⁄ects, increased life expectancy causes, a rise in
investment in human capital (i.e. education). However, it is shown below that







indeterminate. The implication is that the conventional wisdom has to be quali￿ed:
an increase in life expectancy, ￿ z, may or may not lead to a rise in e, the direction
depending on additional conditions.
It is always possible to predict the direction of the change in e￿ when re-
tirement age is held constant. Speci￿cally, the opposite assumption to the one in
Proposition 1 is shown to lead to the opposite result w.r.t. e￿:






Proposition 2 takes retirement age as given and therefore is more limited than
Proposition 1. The explanation for this restriction is the following. As proved in
the Appendix, when ￿(z;￿) increases in z then a decrease in ￿ shifts the curve  
downwards and to the right. It follows that holding R constant (in particular at
R￿), optimum e decreases. The opposite result obtains when ￿(z;￿) decreases in
z, as assumed in Proposition 1. When ￿(z;￿) increases in z, the direction of the
shift in ’ is indeterminate. If ’ shifts upward and to the left then, in contrast to
the result in Proposition 1, R￿ and e￿ both decrease. If, however, ’ shifts downward
and to the right then R￿ and e￿ may increase or decrease. The only impossible
con￿guration is a decrease in R￿ coupled with an increase in e￿. This is the formal
reason why Proposition2 is restricted to a constant R. The economic explanation
is straightforward. When improvements in survival probabilities are concentrated






F(z;￿)dz decreases as ￿ decreases). Hence, the marginal bene￿t
from education decreases, leading to a reduction in the investment in education.
When retirement is also endogenous, one has to consider the interaction of
increased longevity with optimum retirement. Given R and e, a decrease in ￿ in-
creases life expectancy, ￿ z, and expected lifetime work. From the budget constraint,
(5), consumption increases if the former rises more than the latter and vice-versa.
Two e⁄ects are at work: on the one hand, expected lifetime is based on a longer
time span than expected lifetime work. On the other hand, by assumption, im-
provements in survival probabilities are concentrated at the younger working ages.
As seen from (10), the change in consumption a⁄ects the marginal bene￿t of post-
poning retirement. Consequently, since the direction of the change in consumption
is indeterminate so is the age of retirement. This ambiguity feeds, in turn, on the
conditional expected lifetime work.
The general conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that be-
havioral response to a rise in longevity, in particular investment in education and
age of retirement, depends on the age-related changes in survival probabilities,
speci￿cally, changes in hazard rates at di⁄erent ages.
Another conventional wisdom is that "...as individuals live longer, they invest
more in human capital, if and only if, their lifetime labor supply increases" (Hazan,
102009). The logic of this conclusion is clear: starting at an initially optimum level of
education, additional investment in education is justi￿ed only when future earnings
rise by extending then over a longer period.
As stated, this conclusion may be incorrect. The reason is that it is not the
length of the working life that is correlated in the level of education, but rather
the conditional expected lifetime work. Consider an example of equations (10)-(11).
Let F(z;￿) = e￿￿z; 0 ￿ z ￿ 1: For this function, ￿(z;￿) decreases with z: Let
a(R) be highly inelastic around R￿ and let w(e) = e￿; ￿ a constant, 0 < ￿ < 1: The
solution to (10)-(11) can be seen to have ￿e￿ constant while R￿ is approximately
constant, independent of ￿: Thus, a reduction in ￿ raises e￿ proportionately while
R￿ is approximately unchanged. Clearly then, the length of the working period,
R￿ ￿ e￿; decreases as longevity increases.
We now write formally the correct statement about the relation between in-
vestment in education and expected lifetime labor supply:
Proposition 3 Optimum education, e￿, is positively correlated with conditional
expected lifetime work.
Proof. From eq.(11), since w00(e) < 0; the sign of the change in e￿ is the same







Perfect annuitization of savings, assumed in previous sections, is not always avail-
able. Let us conduct the analysis in the absence of longevity insurance markets.
It is assumed that borrowing and lending is possible, hence we disregard liquidity
constraints7. The individual is constrained by a lifetime budget,
T Z
0
c(z)dz ￿ w(e)(R ￿ e) = 0 (12)
7The assumption that the interest rate on non annuitized assets is zero is not realistic since
the death of borrowers may leave lenders with unpaid loan balances. However, incorporation of
a positive interest rate in (12) will not change essentially the following analysis. Note also that
there are now unintended bequests, and hence the analysis below cannot be carried-over to the
economy as a whole without explicitly addressing this issue.
11which replaces (5). The F.O.C. w.r.t. c(z) is now
u
0(c(z))F(z;￿) ￿ ￿ = 0; 0 ￿ z ￿ T (13)









< 0; 0 ￿ z ￿ T (14)
where ￿ = ￿
u00(c)c
u0(c)
> 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. In general, ￿
depends on c.
In the absence of insurance, risk aversion leads the individual to decrease
consumption with age. The rate of decrease is inversely proportional to ￿ and




To simplify the subsequent analysis, we specialize to u(c) = lnc: With ￿ = 1;









￿ a(R) = 0 (16)
and (with a(e) = 0)
 (R;e) = w
0(e)(R ￿ e) ￿ w(e) = 0 (17)
As before, these conditions equate marginal bene￿ts and costs of changes
in R and e. Denote the solution to (16)-(17) by ( ^ R; ^ e): Importantly,   is now
independent of ￿: This enables a sharper result than in Propositions 1 and 2:
Proposition 4 In the absence of annuities, when ￿(z;￿) decreases (increases) in









12As shown in the Appendix the curves ’ and   are upward sloping with ’
steeper than   at the unique intersection point, ( ^ R; ^ e): A decrease in ￿ shifts ’
downward and to the right, hence the new solution has b b R > b R and b b e > b e (Figure
5a). When ￿(z;￿) increases in z this obtain an opposite result: b b R < b R and b b e < b e
(Figure 4b).
Figure 5: ￿1 < ￿0
In the absence of contingent savings, the optimum level of education is deter-
mined by equating (17), the rise in the wage rate caused by a small increase in e
times the length of the working phase, with the marginal costs, namely the wage
rate. While annuity prices depend on survival prospects, these do not a⁄ect directly
the budget constraint (12). A change in ￿ a⁄ects the optimum e only through its
e⁄ect on the age of retirement. The optimum consumption path depends on the
hazard-rate which changes with ￿:
We conclude that in the absence of annuitization, conventional wisdom that
rise in longevity causes an increase in education may be wrong but, as see in (17),
an increase in the investment in education always leads to a longer work phase,
^ R ￿ ^ e:
13Appendix
Two equations determine the optimum (R￿;e￿) :
’(R;e;￿) = u























The functions ’ and   are the ￿rst-order conditions for maximization of V;
(4), w.r.t. R and e, respectively. Using (A.1) and (A.2), second-order conditions


















where ￿ = ￿
u00(c)c
u0(c)











￿ 2 < 0 (A.5)
Since F1(e;￿) < 0; a su¢ cient condition for  e to be negative is that the term






















14A su¢ cient condition for ’e > 0 is ￿ < 1 for all c.
When (A.2) holds (at (R￿;e￿)), (A.5) simpli￿es to
’e = u
0(c)w
0(e) > 0 (A.6)
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Using (A.2) it can be seen that su¢ cient conditions for ￿ > 0 are 2￿ ￿1 > 0























and that ’ = 0 is steeper
than   = 0 at (R￿;e￿): Hence, (R￿;e￿) is unique.

















































































decreases in z, the term in square brackets
in (A.10) is negative for all z. Hence,
@￿
@R
< 0 for all R: Since ￿(T;e;￿) > 0; it
follows that ￿(R;e;￿) > 0 for all 0 ￿ R ￿ T.
Figure A.1
By (A.9) it now follows that ’￿ < 0: This explains why in Figure 3, ’ shifts
upwards and to the left as ￿ decreases.




> 0: Hence, while ￿(T;e;￿) > 0; it is impossible to infer whether ￿ is
16positive for all R and, consequently, it is impossible to determine the direction of
the change in ’:



























When ￿(z;￿) decreases in z; the term in square brackets in (A.11) is negative.
It follows that   shifts downward and to the right. When ￿(z;￿) increases in z;  
shifts in the opposite direction. This proves Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 2 considers the case that ￿(z;￿) increases with z, but the propo-
sition is restricted to a given R. The reason why the joint e⁄ect of a change in ￿
on (R￿;e￿) is indeterminate in this case is because the direction of the shift in ’ is
in determinate.
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